VIEWS FROM EGYPT

Seeking Consensus, the FJP Remains Wary of Alliance with Salafis

2012-01-20T05:21:00.000-08:00

This article was originally published on EgyptSource

Despite widespread speculation to the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing -- the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) -- has consistently ruled out the possibility of forming any strategic alliance with the Salafist Nour Party. Although the two parties have been indiscriminately – and incorrectly -- lumped together as "Islamists" by some observers, the FJP has been keen on maintaining its distinctly moderate outlook by focusing on nationalist alliances instead of ideology-based ones and prioritizing public policy over religious agendas.

The Muslim Brotherhood, much like other parties, was caught off guard by the Salafis electoral gains in the latest People's Assembly elections. With almost a quarter of the seats, the Nour Party came in second to the FJP, and the former’s leader has been nominated for the influential post of deputy speaker of the People’s Assembly, scheduled to convene for its first session on January 23.

A challenge for the FJP now is to maintain its inclusive policy toward other parties without falling into the trap of ideological polarization, and without excluding the Salafis either. The FJP’s track record throughout the transitional phase has proven that it is not seeking strategic alliances with the Salafis nor with other Islamist parties per se, but rather cross-ideological coalitions that can achieve "consensus." The FJP’s commitment to coalition-building gave rise to the Democratic Alliance for Egypt (DAE) in the months following the ousting of Hosni Mubarak, a coalition that started with 13 parties from across the political spectrum aimed at uniting diverse parties around a common political agenda. The DAE was later converted into a powerful electoral coalition which garnered 47 percent of the seats in PA elections. As the only non-ideological coalition competing in the last elections, the DAE offered a middle-of-the road alternative between the secular-dominated Egyptian Bloc, and the Salafi coalition led by Nour Party.

Furthermore, the FJP sought to allay fears of an "Islamist Government" by insisting on its intention to form a coalition government. This would be based on the 11 parties currently in the DAE together with other parties and independents expected to join FJP's coalition from outside the alliance. This indicates that FJP still abides by MB's old—yet still valid—motto "Participation rather than Domination." Based on the same logic behind the traditional slogan, the FJP has stated that it will not field a presidential candidate affiliated with the Brotherhood.

The same applies to the FJP's proposed parliamentary agenda. Unlike its Salafi counterparts, the FJP does not seem to be preoccupied with the strict application of Sharia law. The party is fairly confident that the majority of Egyptians support the second article of the 1971 constitution, which states that "the Principles of Islamic Shariah are the main source of legislation," and that the majority of secular parties also agree with that article. Therefore, the FJP has prioritized socioeconomic reforms that constituted the core of the Revolution's demands. The FJP is aware that what matters most to the millions of underprivileged Egyptians who voted for the party is not simply the reinstating of religious values in society, but more importantly how an FJP-led government would be able to alleviate their deteriorating economic conditions caused by decades of authoritarian and corrupt rule.

Moreover, the FJP has offered a set of reassuring gestures concerning its adherence to the civil and democratic state. In a recent article outlining the vision of the party, Mohamed Morsi, FJP Chairman, reiterated that one of his party's goals is the "establishment of the modern Egyptian civil, constitutional state, based on freedom and democracy," after highlighting twelve challenges perceived to be the party's priorities, on top of them "the principles of liberty and equality" as Morsi states. The party also emphasized respect for press freedom after rumors that accused the FJP of seeking to restrict freedom of expression in the media. In addition, following the latest raids on Egyptian NGOs – following accusations of illegal foreign funding – the FJPdenounced the crackdown, stressing "the importance of the role played by civil society organizations in monitoring government actions, assisting it in reaching the public, and preventing its security forces from returning to the policies and practices of oppression and injustice and tyranny that prevailed in the days of the defunct former regime, by monitoring the actions and movements of these forces, and conveying this information to the public in a completely transparent process."

While the above examples provide ample evidence of FJP's willingness to undertake the role of a responsible political player in post-revolutionary Egypt, it is yet to transform words into actions as it gears up for the establishment of Egypt's long-awaited democracy. The enormous challenges ahead require national consensus and unity towards achieving the goals of the revolution. Apparently, the FJP is aware of the delicate balancing act that is needed to build a politically and ideologically inclusive coalition, and is therefore treading very cautiously.

Wir brauchen keine Quote

2012-01-20T05:17:00.000-08:00

My article in Die Tage Zeitung about the status of Egyptian women after the revolution.

"Wir brauchen keine Quote"

ÄGYPTEN Die Muslimschwester Sondos Asem lebt in Kairo und betreut die englischsprachige Seite der Muslimbrüder. Sie verlangt mehr Bürgerrechte

Als ich am 25. Januar letzten Jahres auf die Straße ging, um gegen Mubaraks korrupte Polizei und seine diktatorische Politik zu demonstrieren, nahmen Zehntausende andere Aktivisten an dem Protest in der Ramses-Straße teil - Männer und Frauen, Alte und Junge, Säkulare und Religiöse, Muslime und Christen. Alle riefen nach Wandel, Freiheit und sozialer Gerechtigkeit.

Ich fühlte, was es heißt, sich für die Rechte aller Ägypter einzusetzen, unabhängig von Religion, Hautfarbe oder Geschlecht. Das ist eine Errungenschaft unserer großartigen Revolution. Sie bringt auch den mächtigen Einfluss zum Vorschein, den die Partizipation von Frauen am politischen Wandel haben kann.

Die Ägypter haben gemerkt, dass der Schlüssel zu jeglicher Veränderung in der Achtung der individuellen Freiheit und Würde liegt. Daher wird die Verletzung der Würde von Frauen nicht toleriert werden. Das haben der öffentliche Aufschrei und die Proteste gezeigt, die sich gegen das brutale Vorgehen der Militärpolizei gegen Aktivistinnen auf dem Tahrirplatz richteten. Diese Militärpolizei versuchen wir nach der Wahl zu entmachten.

Wegen Mubaraks autoritärer und korrupter Herrschaft und dem Verfall der Wirtschaft sind über 20 Prozent der ägyptischen Jugend arbeitslos, knapp die Hälfte davon sind Frauen. Die Analphabetenrate unter den jungen Leuten liegt bei mehr als 20 Prozent, und mehr als 40 Prozent leben mit weniger als 2 US-Dollar pro Tag.

Die unmenschlichen Lebensbedingungen haben starke Auswirkungen auf die Lage der Frauen. So war die Verbreitung von abscheulichen Praktiken wie der Genitalverstümmlung in diesen unterprivilegierten Gesellschaftsschichten unvermeidbar. Das liegt am mangelhaften Gesundheitsbewusstsein und am Befolgen negativer Traditionen, unabhängig von ihren verheerenden Folgen für die Frauen.

In einem demokratischen Ägypten müssen die Wurzeln der Marginalisierung von Frauen bekämpft werden, also Armut und Analphabetismus. Die aktive Rolle von Frauen in den Familien und im öffentlichen Leben muss gefördert werden.

Quoten brauchen wir nicht, sie unterschätzen die Fähigkeiten von Frauen, mit Männern auf der Basis ihrer Qualifikation um öffentliche Posten zu konkurrieren, nicht auf der Basis ihres Geschlechts. Die Teilhabe von Frauen muss sowohl von der Regierung als auch von der Zivilgesellschaft ermutigt werden.

Bei der Wiedererweckung unseres Landes werden die ägyptischen Frauen die Partnerinnen der Männer sein - dies auf der Grundlage gemeinsamer Anstrengungen und dem Beharren auf unseren Rechten, die wir als würdige Menschen und als gleiche Bürger in der Gesellschaft haben. Diese werden nur in einem zivilen, demokratischen Staat gewahrt werden können, in dem kein Platz ist für Diskriminierung aufgrund von Religion oder Geschlecht.

Also, beten wir dafür, dass das Jahr 2012 unserer Region mehr Freiheit bringt!

Sondos Asem, 24, betreut die Seite der Muslimbrüderwww.ikhwanweb.com. Sie twittert unter @SondosAsem

Ägypten

Frauenwahlrecht: seit 1956

Verfassung: "Die Bürger sind vor dem Gesetz gleich […]. Es gibt keine Diskriminierung aufgrund von Geschlecht, Herkunft, Sprache, Religion oder Überzeugung", steht in der provisorischen Verfassung. Kritisiert wurde, dass in dem Komitee, das sie 2011 erarbeitete, keine Frau vertreten war.

Rechtslage: Diskriminierungen im Familienrecht. Seit 2005 können Frauen aber die Staatsbürgerschaft an die Kinder weitergeben. Musliminnen haben das Recht auf Scheidung ohne Zustimmung des Ehemanns, Christinnen nicht.

Ökonomisch aktiv: 35,7 Prozent der Frauen

Arbeitslosigkeit: 9 Prozent; 15- bis 24-Jährige: 47,9 Prozent (Frauen), 17,2 Prozent (Männer)

AnalphabetInnen: 56,4 Prozent (Frauen), 32,8 Prozent (Männer)

The Quest for Mutual Interest and Mutual Respect: Revisiting U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Muslim World

2010-04-03T09:14:00.000-07:00

ABSTRACT:

U.S. Public Diplomacy has been facing much criticism over the past decade. As a foreign policy tool, public diplomacy, by definition, should be aimed at bridging divides among nations and searching for a common ground that would help foster mutual understanding of every nation’s foreign policy and culture. The United States, however, has misused, or rather failed to pursue a true public diplomacy effort that would find solutions to many foreign policy dilemmas facing both the United States and the Muslim World. In this paper, I will revisit the concept of public diplomacy in light of the two-way communication model, and more specifically, will present a critique of the one-way approach that characterized much of U.S. public diplomacy in the past decade. The role of civil society in an effective public diplomacy will be emphasized, as well as an examination of other players, such as the internet, and the youth in both sides.

INTRODUCTION:

Most of the criticism directed to U.S. foreign policy in the past decade has been related to the biased rhetoric used by U.S. officials with regard to the Muslim World. The use of terminology such as “Radical Islam,” “Muslim Terrorists,” and “Islamic Fascism” has been very common, particularly during the Bush administration, where U.S. public diplomacy has achieved its poorest results, as proved by the multiple public opinion polls during and after the Bush administration. Bush’s public diplomacy in the Muslim World has been criticized for three major reasons: first, it was largely based on one-way communication instead of a sincere effort to listen to and engage the other in real conversations; second, it revealed lack of understanding of the complex and diverse nature of the Muslim World, and worse, fostered stereotypes about this part of the world that were considered a major reason behind the rise of extremism in both sides since the attacks of 9-11 and afterwards; third, military power replaced soft power as a means to fight extremism. All these factors contributed greatly to the rising anti-American sentiments in the Muslim World, combined with anti-Islamic sentiments in the United States. In such a climate, a pressing need emerged for public diplomatic communication that would alleviate misconceptions on both sides, and enhance mutual understanding and peace. Such form of public diplomacy was rarely implemented in an honest strategic way, but rather U.S. public diplomacy has been primarily geared towards propaganda and pure self interest, albeit with little success. A successful public diplomacy, however, must take into account mutual interests and mutual understanding as its primary goal. To pursue self-interest alone in today’s globalized world is no longer a viable strategy, since national security has been threatened more than ever due to such self-interested foreign policies. Mutual understanding is, therefore, the best strategy to be sought by both the United States and the Muslim World in order to confront common international perils and threats. This can best be achieved through public diplomacy.

Public Diplomacy, a Background:

Most of public diplomacy’s early definitions revolve around the concept of propaganda and promoting the national interest of the United States, with very seldom mentioning of the goal of mutual understanding. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Dictionary of International Relations Terms, public diplomacy is defined as “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.” Similarly, the Planning Group for Integration of the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the U.S. Department of State defines public diplomacy as a process that “seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences.” Another definition is that of Richard J. Kilroy, Jr. from the Virginia Military Institute, where he describes public diplomacy as an arrow that “involves both diplomacy and the use of information to help sway public opinion overseas toward U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives” (Kilroy Jr., 2005). USIA, which was the agency in charge of U.S. public diplomacy from 1953 to 1999, defined public diplomacy as follows: “Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.” (www.publicdiplomacy.org). In the latter definition, the element of dialogue is emphasized for a typical public diplomacy, which gives the definition much more validity and thoroughness than the previous ones.

The Public Diplomacy Alumni Association (formerly the USIA Alumni Assciation) mentions in its website (www.publicdiplomacy.org) that “[a]ccording to a Library of Congress study of U.S. international and cultural programs and activities prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, the term `public diplomacy' was first used in 1965 by Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. It was created with the establishment at Fletcher of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy." It further quotes the Murrow Center’s detailed description of the term public diplomacy as follows: “Public diplomacy . . . deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.” This is perhaps one of the most encompassing definitions of the term public diplomacy, as it sheds light on the role of publics, rather than governments, in the nature and practice of public diplomacy. It also mentions two key actors in public diplomatic communication: non-governmental groups and foreign public opinion, and stresses on the interaction between these and their domestic counterparts. Central to the previous definition is the idea of public diplomacy as “people-to-people” interaction that emerged over the years from government-to-government, diplomat-to-diplomat, then government-to-people, until it reached the era of “citizen diplomats” thanks to the massive developments in information technology and new media (Wang 2004).

DATA:

This research project was conducted using several methods. First, a number of three relevant published journal articles were retrieved from the online research database Communication and Mass Media Complete (CMMC), each of them covering a different angle of the topic. Second, from U.S. think tanks, four major reports were reviewed, three of them are released by the Brookings Institution: The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World (2004), Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21^st Century (2008), The Opportunity of the Obama Era: Can Civil Society Help Bridge Divides between the United States and a Diverse Muslim World? (2009), and the fourth by the Council on Foreign Relations titled Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy (2003). A key database for the information presented in this paper is the official website of the Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, formerly USIA Alumni Association (www.publicdiplomacy.org), which offers a useful reference for definitions related to the topic as well as up-to-date links to related online articles.

In addition, three in-depth one-on-one interviews were conducted to cover various areas in the topic from multiple viewpoints. The interviewees are experts and practitioners of public diplomacy, each in their own context. They include former Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. Nabil Fahmy, the deputy press attaché of the American Embassy in Cairo Robert Greenan, and Shamil Idriss, CEO, U.S.-based Soliya Online Connect Program.

DATA ANALYSIS:

Much of the theoretical framework for this research is related to theories of decoding and effects. In this case propaganda and persuasion are two close concepts to the topic under discussion. Yet they are not similar. Persuasion has been defined as “attitude change resulting from exposure to information from others” (Olson and Zanna 1993), while propaganda, according to Lasswell, refers to “the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations” (1937). To make a clear distinction between the two, psychologist Roger Brown (1958) pointed out that persuasive efforts can be called propaganda “when someone judges that the action which is the goal of the persuasive effort will be advantageous to the persuader but not in the best interests of the persuadee” (p. 300). Therefore, as Severin and Tankard put it, “only when it is perceived that an act benefits the source, but not the receiver, can such an act or message be called propaganda” (p. 109). This paper is trying to show that propaganda is not the best tool for U.S. public diplomacy to be effective, since it mirrors one-way communicative approaches that further alienate foreign public opinion.

RESULTS:

The literature and interviews revealed three major critical issues in the current academic and intellectual debate on U.S. public diplomacy, which will be discussed in detail in this paper. First, inspired by the heavily one-sided discourse of the Bush administration, there is usually a critique of the one-way communication method typical of propaganda, and calls for a new two-way communication approach that would enhance public diplomacy and garner positive results both on the foreign and domestic public opinion fronts. Second, the role of civil society is reintroduced as an alternative and a more effective player than the government. Third, there is a renewed interest in engaging the youth as an important segment of the public diplomatic process, particularly with the advent of the internet and global information technologies.

One-way versus Two-way Communication:

The central goal of U.S. public diplomacy in the past decade has been the transmission of information to foreign publics, which is the traditional mission of public diplomacy. “Public diplomacy involves the communication of a government to the people of another nation with the goal of influencing their image of the sender nation,” as Dutta-Bergman states, “it is government’s process of communicating with foreign publics with an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and cultures, as well as national goals and current policies” (Dutta-Bergman, 2006, p.4). In her analysis of U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East, Dutta-Bergman proposes a “culture-centered approach” as an alternative to “colonizing one-way stance that breeds further violence” (p.24). The culture-centered approach, according to Dutta-Bergman, concentrates on relations between cultures instead of the typical one-way approaches whose purpose and emphasis is on “massaging” the mind of receivers, driven by “motives of gaining public support for U.S. policies in the Middle East, securing profitable markets, and creating a positive image of the United States” (p.20). This one-way flow embodies the “oppressive force” of public diplomacy which “seeks to alter one culture in order to suit the preferences of another culture, based on differences in access to power” (p.21). Thus the one-way communication approach heavily used by the Bush administration was to a large extent the driving force behind much of the violent events that erupted since the election of George W. Bush in the year 2000. This violence was largely the result of the accumulation of negative foreign public opinion about the U.S. due to the failed public diplomacy agenda of the U.S. government. The rising mutual misconceptions between the U.S. and the Muslim World constituted another negative result of the one-way approach. As Dutta-Bergman further states, “[t]he articulation of problems by the sender without engaging the cultural members of the receiving space reflects a myopic conceptualization of the communicative process, leaving a great deal of space for misconception of the problem and the accompanying solutions … The absence of the receiver from the initial communicative process inundates the discursive space with noise and misunderstanding” (p.23). Alternatively, dialogue is the main constituent of the culture-centered approach, and is aimed at relationship building rather than persuasion and hegemony, and it should lead to mutual understanding and respect, which are the essential targets of an ideal public diplomacy.

Inherent in the discussion of communicative public diplomacy efforts is the messenger problem. A central question here is: who is the public diplomat? Traditionally, this job has been filled by government officials and is now the duty of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the U.S. State Department. However, to limit the public diplomacy mission to government efforts alone is a rather flawed perception of the term. As Wang argues, “with worldwide proliferation of communication media and affordable information access, the credibility of the government, as the primary communicator, is now often suspect” (Wang 2004, p.12). In fact, even when the U.S. state department hired public diplomacy officials, there have always been criticisms of the qualifications of those in charge. For instance, what received most criticism, to effect public diplomacy, the State Department initially hired people from Madison Avenue and they had focus groups, who were mostly American, trying to decide what the problem was (Fahmy, 2009). Following the dissolution of the USIA, Bush nominated Charlotte Beers to be the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Beers was a Madison Avenue professional before she was appointed to this job. According to Kilroy Jr., she brought “an advertiser’s approach” to public diplomacy, leading many to see the job as “a matter of selling America overseas” (Kilroy Jr., 2005). As former Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Nabil Fahmy narrates, she produced a video at the beginning of her short tenure titled Muslim Life in America depicting how well Muslims lived in the United States and portraying American tolerance towards Islam in a post 9-11 attempt to “win the hearts and minds” of Muslims. According to Fahmy, who was consulted before the video was broadcast, this was one example of the failed public diplomacy campaign during the Bush administration. When he was asked to give his opinion on the video, Fahmy’s answer was, “nice video, but it’s not going to achieve the purpose. First reason, it is too much propaganda, and propaganda has very little shelf life. Secondly, you are talking about Muslims in America, while nobody was questioning U.S. position on Muslims in America. The problem in the minds of Muslims around the world is why you are biased on some of the political issues that concern them, specially the Arab-Israeli conflict.” So, according to Fahmy, the United States chose the wrong people to carry out the public diplomatic role, and as a result, public diplomacy has totally missed the point. Since they were hiring the wrong messengers, they consequently “did not define the problem properly, did not understand the Muslim-Arab context correctly, and dealt with this as if it were a short-term commercial problem.”

Role of Civil Society:

Civil society in recent years has gained much weight as an integral part of the public diplomatic function. As defined by the Center for Civil Society, civil society refers to "the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group" (http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm). In a globalize world, those actors have in fact become an essential mediator in cross-cultural encounters, particularly with the declining role and credibility of governments. Civil society has exponentially grown in the aftermath of 9/11 both in the United States and the Muslim World with the aim to bridge the two region's divides.

A recent Brookings report titled The Opportunity of the Obama Era: Can Civil Society help Bridge Divides between the United States and a Diverse Muslim World? Stresses on the urgent need to reinvigorate civil society initiatives that aim at better understanding between the United State and the Muslim World. The report specifically argues that building support between civil society actors in the two worlds is a top priority that would greatly help to strengthen international security through mutual understanding and open communication channels. With the election of Obama, and the significant change in rhetoric from the "either with us or against us" discourse to the quest for "mutual interest and mutual respect" as articulated in Obama's historic speech to the Muslim World, many voices in both arenas have elevated hopes for a real improvement in mutual understanding to face their mutual challenges. The paper, as its author states, provides "guidelines for how engagement on the people-to-people front, can best be conducted to bridge the divide," offering four key recommendations:

· It is vital to define success and measure it. For the most part these initiatives seek to transform attitudes across the divide, but few if any have defined how to measure these shifts in attitudes. Initiatives must develop success indicators, and undertake pre- and post- participation evaluations of attitudes by participants of the “other”. In this situation, "success," is considered to be achieving the desired impact of the project, and thus can be measured when specific goals are laid out. Further, funders should develop indicators to be used in cross-initiative analysis.

· Jointness is key. Joint partnerships are the key to successful initiatives. Ideally, projects should be jointly funded, jointly managed, and jointly implemented across the divide that the initiative is attempting to bridge—and generally, in this case, with one partner in the United States and one in the Muslim world. Jointness should begin with project design, and continue throughout the life of the project so that both sides can learn from one another and improve the overall initiative.

· Stakeholder outreach is needed. The third strategic step for initiatives is to decide who to invite to the table. Initiatives should reach beyond the “usual suspects” and avoid “preaching to the choir.” Outreach should target segments of society that normally do not talk, including conservatives and ideological opposites from each side of the divide.

· Results can be multiplied. Initiative managers can and should have a plan to multiply the impact of their work whether through the media or other public relations mechanisms. All but the most secret, closed door sessions can be conveyed to a broader audience in some way for broader social impact. (Amr 2009)

Such policy recommendations are themselves vital in improving the status quo. Polling data are perhaps the key indicator for any such improvement, which is yet to take place due to the lack of a strategic endeavor in that direction.

Role of Youth:

Besides improvement of civil society, outreach to the youth constitutes a strategic segment in public diplomacy efforts. Not only are they the future of countries, but they also represent a quarter of the Muslim World's population (http://www.isesco.org.ma/arabe/publications/machakil%20chabab/p4.php) and a similar figure in the United States. Another policy report by the Brookings Institution included in its key recommendations a call for engaging the youth as one important opportunity: "the rapidly growing cohort of youth in Muslim-majority countries should be seen as an opportunity, rather than just a threat… Technological connectivity often familiarizes them with American culture and policy and Is a cornerstone for expansion" (Amr 2004). An interview with the deputy press attaché at the United States Embassy in Cairo revealed that most of their public diplomacy outreach is targeting the youth, starting from high school students to university graduates (Greenan 2009). Their most important program is the YES program (Youth Exchange Program) that sponsors youth exchanges between youth in Egyptian high schools (particularly Islamic schools) and their U.S. counterparts.

Soliya and Terana:

One of the remarkable U.S. non-governmental initiatives that target dialogue between the Muslim World and the United States is the online social network Soliya (http://www.soliya.net). Founded in 2005, the site attracted significant participation from University students across the Muslim World and results showed positive and encouraging attitudes among participants after the program. Under "what we do" link the website states that "Soliya is a pioneering non-profit organization using new technologies to facilitate dialogue between students from diverse backgrounds across the globe." Its flagship program, the Connect Program, uses the latest web-conferencing technology to bridge the gap between university students in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and the United States. "In a time when media plays an increasingly powerful role in shaping peoples’ viewpoints on political issues, Soliya provides students with the opportunity, skills, and tools to shape and articulate their own viewpoints on some of the most pressing global issues facing their generation." Soliya’s Connect Program is facilitated by a cross-cultural team of young leaders drawn from over 25 different countries. Each semester, Soliya carefully evaluates its Connect Program to ensure that it is effectively enabling students to build skills, knowledge & relationships. Each semester the evaluation results have demonstrated that the Connect Program has been very effective in meeting Soliya’s Objectives. The connect program, as mentioned in the site, has three key objectives:

• ENGAGE in weekly facilitated dialogue sessions via Soliya’s online videoconferencing application. The medium is remarkably intimate: participants can see one another’s facial expressions, hear tone of voice, and even share a joke. The dialogue is far-reaching, covering a wide range of issues that currently divide the West and the Arab & Muslim World. The conversation is carefully facilitated, ensuring that students directly address the difficult issues that divide them in a way that enables genuine understanding of alternate perspectives and reconsideration of previously held views.

• EXPLORE a multi-media online library containing a wide range of resources including raw news and interview footage, academic and policy articles, websites, and lectures from relevant experts. These resources form the basis for many of the discussions.

• EXPRESS their understanding of the issues discussed by creating two media projects over the period of the semester. For the first, they edit together a short video segment using simple video editing software and raw footage provided by Al Jazeera and APTN. This experience empowers students to voice their own opinions and encourages them to develop a personal connection with the issues. It also provides them with insights into the video production process, thereby demystifying television journalism and providing them with critical media literacy and media production skills. For their final project, students work together in cross-cultural teams to collaboratively develop a Joint Project. Students are able to choose between a number of different options for the Joint Project. The most popular option is the Joint-Editorial, in which students write editorials with their counterparts on issues relevant to the relationship between the Arab & Muslim World and the West. Selected articles that particularly exemplify this collaborative process are then distributed via the Common Ground News Service. Approximately 25% of student articles written in 2005-7 were published by international newspapers such as the Daily Star in Beirut and the Washington Times.

Moreover, the project has a diverse Board of Directors and Advisory Board that reflect the policy of the initiative, that is a cross-cultural staff that is aware of the diversity of backgrounds in the dialogue. Lately, Soliya has planned to launch Terana, another online social network with a renewed vision to bolster understanding, but in this case with a special focus on the United States and the Muslim World, inspired by Barack Obama's remark "Kansas to Cairo" in his speech to the Muslim World in June 2009. As Soliya CEO, Shamil Idriss, stated in an interview with the author, "through extensive consultation with our staff and with diverse students who went through Soliya's university-based Connect Program, we have chosen the name "Terana" for the network - deriving it from the Arabic suffix "na" for "our" and the Latin word "terra" for "Earth". Just as the name Soliya was developed with the intention to evoke the principles of illumination and education, Terana is intended to connect that illumination to the concrete actions we take here on Earth." Participants in this program will "use new media technologies collectively to promote cross-cultural understanding within and between their societies." In addition, Idriss added that " At the center of our strategy for developing Terana is a belief that the "Core" of that network, the "seed" from which the online community will ultimately grow, will be a critical determinant of its long-term success. Therefore, our primary goal from now until our public launch (planned now for early November 2010), is to identify 150-250 extraordinary young adults from around the world who collectively represent a broad diversity of cultural, religious, ideological, political, and socio-economic backgrounds, to cultivate their individual capacities, and to develop a strong sense of community and common purpose among them in line with our mission."

Such projects as Soliya and Terana are perhaps much more constructive than any government efforts, particularly with the retarding credibility of governmental programs. In fact, when Shamil Idriss was offered government support for his program at the White House, he rejected and preferred to remain independent, yet with mutual benefits to all. What is unique about this initiative is how it combines three instrumental elements of modern public diplomacy, that is the Youth, the Internet, and Civil Society.

Discussion:

The above analysis demonstrates that current public diplomacy needs a paradigm shift in both theory and practice. When it comes to U.S. public diplomacy in the Muslim World, a new strategy is required to achieve "mutual interest and mutual respect," which should be dealt with as the benchmark of the Obama administration's public diplomacy efforts. In facing common challenges, the U.S. and the Muslim World need to identify mutual understanding as a strategic goal in the fight against extremism worldwide. Propaganda must not be equated with public diplomacy, since the former is an inherently one-way approach that necessarily involves incoherent rhetoric that further widens the divide between the two worlds, while the latter is essentially a two-way communicative process that requires engagement and cooperation between the two sides. "In the increasingly interconnected and integrated global society," as Wang puts it, "enhancing understanding between nations and peoples through strategic public diplomacy fulfills an ethical and moral imperative of promoting global peace and development" (Wang 2004).

Conclusion:

This paper represents an attempt to revisit the notion of public diplomacy from a contemporary perspective. What has been tackled in the paper, particularly the role of civil society and youth, requires further investigation and analysis to identify factors for a more effective U.S. public diplomacy with the Muslim World. Case studies are needed for this purpose, as well as a deeper research into the meanings and significance of new public diplomacy terminology associated with the Obama administration, such as the concept of "smart power" put forth by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye and used recently by U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton as a characteristic of U.S. foreign policy under Obama, triggering a heated debate about the efficacy of the term, which combines the use of soft power and military power in dealing with external challenges and threats.

Bibliography:

Amr, Hady. (2009). The Opportunity of the Obama Era: Can Civil Society Help Bridge Divides Between the Unites States and a Diverse Muslim World?. Brookings Doha Center. The Brookings Institution. Retrieved November 6, 2009 from http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/11_civil_society_amr.aspx

Brookings Institution. (2004). The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World. Washington, D.C.: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institutiton.

Brookings Institution. (2008). Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21^st Century.Washington DC.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2003). Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for

Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy. New York: The Council on Foreign

Relations.

Dutta-Bergman, M. J. (2006). "U.S. Public Relations in the Middle East: A Critical Analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Sheraton New York, New York City, NY Online . 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p15118_index.html

Fahmy, Nabil. (November 2009). Interview with the author. The American University in Cairo.

Greenan, Robert. (November 2009). Interview with the author. Semiramis Intercontinental Hotel. Cairo.

Idriss, Shamil. (October 2009). Interview with the author. Flaminco Hotel. Cairo.

Kilroy Jr., Richard J., (2005). "Public Diplomacy: Government, Universities, and the War on Terrorism." Journal of Public Affairs; 2005, Vol. 8, p123-144, 22p

Severin, Werner j. & Tankard, jr., James. (2001). Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, and Uses in the Mass Media. New York, Longman.

wang, j. (2004). "Effectively Managing National Reputation: Strategic Public Diplomacy Revisited" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Sheraton New York, New York City, NY Online . 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p13418_index.html

Social Networking Sites As Platforms For Activism In the Arab World

2009-10-27T16:31:00.000-07:00

Social Networking Sites (SNSs) in the Arab world are rapidly evolving from an outlet for socializing and intercommunication to a venue for political and social activism. With all the limitations on freedom of assembly, association and expression in the region, sites like Facebook and Twitter have offered an online substitute for real life activism. Those activists are empowered by “the massive decline in the costs of mobile communications, the spread of the internet in the developing world, the growth of blogs and social networking services, the ease of self-publishing and organizing, and the increasing ability of individuals to engage in many to many communications” (Faris 2008, para. 2). This, however, does not mean that SNSs provide an equally effective means of activism like real political struggle. Some, which is the dominant view, argue that it can turn out to be no more than a virtual reality where youth diffuse their dissatisfaction with their status quo with minimum echoes on the ground.

In Egypt, Facebook has by far been the most popular outlet for representing political affiliations and also a successful tool for mass mobilization. The world has been following with curiosity the Facebook group “6 April” whose founders managed to mobilize some 70,000 supporters of their call for a strike in solidarity with workers in the delta town of Al Mahalla who were protesting against low wages and bread prices(http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#/group.php?sid=f5b82f7a5544062cac77 4fcce0f262a7&gid=9973986703&ref=search). The day April 6 turned out to be one of the most successful stay-at-home strikes in the history of the country. Members of the group spread the word to their community of relatives, neighbors, and friends, and hence the mass mobilization function of SNSs.

In a cross-continental networking example, in the occasion of Gaza war waged by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) against the Gaza strip, Facebook, twitter, and second life, the top three SNSs were approached by both sides of the dispute, each for its own purposes. According to Will Ward, the Israeli assault on Gaza "has turned social media to the forefront of Middle East Politics"(Ward 2009, para.1). Thousands of groups were created on Facebook by sympathizers from both sides, each competing to show their side's plight. A common invitation for the site's users at the time was to "donate their status" for providing an up-to-the-minute update about the number of victims on the Palestinian side, and rockets fired at the Israeli side. Moreover, Israeli officials held an online press conference using Twitter, a social networking site that enables its users to send updates about their lives in messages that do not exceed 140 character (http://www.Twitter.com). On the other side, Hamas officials held an online press conference using Second Life, an online virtual world where users, called Residents, interact with each other through avatars (http://secondlife.com).

These online movements, however, have had a temporary effect. In the case of "6 April", whose members were subject to retaliatory crackdown by the government, the strike urged the President to agree on a 30% pay raise for public sector workers. Most analysts viewed this step as the direct result of the strike. However, the online group itself has been inactive ever since, and even its founder Esraa Abdel Fattah was reported as saying she will not continue her cyber activity. As David Faris puts it "most times, joining a Facebook group is a one-and-done affair-users rarely return to the site of the group they joined" (Faris 2008, para. 21). "Recent research on digital advertising," says Ward, " suggests that users simply turn out repeated messages transmitted on social networking sites."(Ward 2009, para 17).

Egyptian outspoken blogger Hossam El Hamalawy is one of the cyber activists who did not believe in the effectiveness of the "6 April" phenomenon without a parallel activity on the ground. In an interview with his fellow blogger Sami Ben Gharbia he mentioned why he did not endorse the call for another strike on the birthday of President Mubarak on May 4. "We, the Egyptian bloggers, have always prided ourselves on the fact that we have one foot on the ground and the other in the cyberspace… But this time, it seems some have thrown both their feet as well as brains in the cyberspace and are living some virtual reality, mistakenly believing (helped by the media sensationalist coverage of the “facebook activism“) that they are the ones behind the events in Mahalla" (Gharbia, 2008, para. 3). Noura Younes, another prominent blogger, agreed with El Hamalawy, but insisted the strike was a success both because of the internet and also the popular base (Gharbia, 2008, para. 5).

Still, the internet allows the message to get out. SNSs can be used "as a means of getting out protest messages" and as Reporter Without Borders (RSF) mentions, "the internet represents an invaluable space for the new Egyptian generation since it is gradually replacing the unions and political campaigning in the universities." (RSF, 2009, para. 8). Moreover, "since any type of meeting is banned under the state of emergency law which the country has been under for nearly 28 years, the internet allows meetings to be held through a computer" (para. 7).

It is true that the appeal SNSs have now might be not permanent. Activists everywhere, however, can no longer do without the technological tools provided via the internet. But change requires echoes to be heard on the ground and active engagement of people through "offline" and face to face methods.

References

Faris, D. (2008, September) . Arab Media and Society. Revolutions Without Revolutionaries? Network Theory, Facebook, and The Egyptian Blogosphere. Retrieved April 22, 2009 from http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=694

Gharbia, S. (2008, April 30). Global Voices Online. Egypt: Facebooking the Struggle. Retrieved April 22, 2009, from http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/04/30/egypt-facebooking-the- struggle/

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) (2009, April 6). Egypt: Internet: A Weapon of Mass Revolution? Retrieved April 22, 2009, from http://www.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=30765

Ward, W. (2009, January). Arab Media and Society. Social Media In The Gaza Conflict. Retrieved April 22, 2009 from http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=701

*Written April 2009

Egyptian Bloggers, A Fifth Estate?

2009-10-27T16:25:00.000-07:00

The past decade has witnessed a remarkable development in the new media environment especially with the advent of blogging as an innovative means of communication and self-expression. Internet activists, as David Faris puts it, are the most empowered by recent technological innovations in information communications technologies: “the massive decline in the costs of mobile communications, the spread of the internet in the developing world, the growth of blogs and social networking services, the ease of self-publishing and organizing, and the increasing ability of individuals to engage in many to many communications” (Faris 2008, para. 2). The internet’s inherent communicative capacity and convergence has provided an outlet for human beings to interact, exchange ideas, track news, gain knowledge, store information, and simultaneously entertain themselves without the time or place restrictions consistent with broadcast and print media. In the developing world, however, this capacity has given way to other social and political functions of new media, particularly with the stifling limitations on freedom of expression in the highly authoritarian states of most of the developing world. This has been the case in Egypt, the country with the highest internet penetration rate in the African continent (20% of the population regularly goes online according to RSF), and one of the Arab world’s most politically and economically unstable nations.

Blogging began in Egypt in 2003-2004 (Isherwood 2008, para.16) coinciding with the political awakening ahead of the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections as well as the notorious constitutional amendments, all deemed to be undemocratic and consolidating the country’s authoritarian status quo. Many young Egyptian activists from across the political spectrum resorted to cyberspace as a safer place for assembly, mobilization, self-expression, and above all criticism of the stagnant political environment which they viewed as the reason behind all other crises. That is why bloggers have had tense relations with the state since the start of blogging in Egypt.

The blogosphere has played significant roles in Egypt. A watchdog, fifth estate, or a catalyst for social change, blogging has been increasingly capable of setting news agendas not only for cyberspace but also for older media such as satellite television and the press. According to Isherwood, “bloggers have extended the ability of existing political movements to organize, they have spurred independent campaigns and political actions separate from mainstream Egyptian opposition politics, and they have driven internal debate within some political organizations by giving the youth a prominent uncensored platform” (Isherwood, 2008, para. 29).

The role of bloggers as the “fifth estate” has been recently introduced by Media researcher Stephen D. Cooper in his Watching the Watchdog where he argues that bloggers have an ability to identify or correct errors that appear in media discourse, and then compel media agencies to acknowledge those mistakes (Cooper, 2006). This is further reaffirmed by Rania El Malky who argues that “although bloggers have been widely associated with direct efforts to push for political reform in Egypt, their greatest role had probably been in indirectly pressuring for media reform” (El Malky 2007, para. 42). This is particularly true if we consider the effect bloggers had on encouraging other media to tackle government abuses. The media in their print, broadcast, and online forms has been emboldened to criticize the government after blogs, many of them anonymous, undertook to expose government corruption and violations of human rights especially by Egyptian police without the kind of fear that has often obliged journalists and editors to exercise self-censorship lest they face any government crackdown on their publications. This means that by monitoring mainstream media, bloggers have been able to help them practice freedom of expression, which has long been a taboo. Viewed another way, blogging has “provided a refreshing dynamism and momentum to the independent media sector in Egypt,” as El Malky puts it (para. 50).

However, the impact of blogs on old media is not a revolutionary one. In other words, the emergence of blogging did not essentially replace old media, but rather it simply intensified and speeded up trends that had already begun with satellite media and opposition press (Isherwood 2008, para. 40). Moreover, like online news sources, Egyptian blogs have been able to set news agendas by almost uniformly focusing on issues of human rights, press freedom, and opposition to the regime, and acting as a reference and news source for foreign news agencies. A blog like Arabist, run by the leftist blogger Hossam El Hamalawi, focuses on Egyptian workers’ news plus relevant human rights issues (http://arabist.net). His blog now is the ultimate place for foreign journalists and news sources tracking workers news, including protests, strikes, and day to day news and footage. This reflects one of the most important functions of blogging in Egypt, namely citizen journalism (Isherwood 2008, para. 30). In fact, many Egyptian bloggers, like Abdel Monem Mahmoud (ana-ikhwan.blogspot.com) who is now working for the daily Al Dostour, identify themselves as journalists, and were eventually hired by independent and opposition newspapers after their blogs became known.

The role of a watchdog, however, has perhaps been more prominent in Egyptian blogosphere with bloggers competing to publish material that criticize, or at times incriminate government officials. It was Wael Abbas, probably the most renowned Egyptian blogger, who lead to the conviction of two police officers on charges of torturing a citizen by posting videos on his blog Al Waei Al Masri “Egyptian Awareness” (misrdigital.blogspirit.com) showing them sodomizing a minibus driver, by far the most controversial torture case in decades. Other bloggers also helped bring this case, as well as others, to the public’s attention by rebroadcasting the videos in their own blogs. Issues of “prisoners of conscience” or political prisoners were also the subject of many bloggers in the period following 2005 and the arrest of presidential candidate Ayman Nour and Muslim Brotherhood leaders who were referred to military tribunals, both incidents viewed as politically motivated. Blogs such as “Free Ayman Nour” (www.freeaymannour.org) and “Ensaa” (ensaa.blogspot.com), besides many other individual blogs, were devoted to exposing violations and monitoring publications about both cases, leading journalists to refer to the blogs whenever they needed an update.

The direct impact the watchdog role had on Egyptian blogosphere was crackdown which led to concerns about prospects of press freedom in the country, triggering calls for less restrictions on freedom of expression and internet activism. The Paris-based advocacy group Reporters Without Borders (RSF) in its latest report about Egypt entitled “Internet: A Weapon of Mass Revolution?” mentioned that “the vast majority of the country’s prisoners of opinion are bloggers or activists imprisoned for posting political messages.” The case of Karim Amer, a blogger jailed for posting articles deemed “insulting to Islam” and insulting the President,” sent shock waves throughout the Egyptian blogosphere, and his arrest according to RSF had “a chilling effect on free speech” in Egypt (RSF 2009, para. 2). Indeed, many bloggers were intimidated by Amer’s detention and some of them even closed down their blogs for fear of censorship. But arrest is not the only procedure that threatens free speech. As Isherwood puts it, “intimidation, character assassination, and trumped up charges are even more common tools of censorship than arrests.” (Isherwood, 2008, para. 90) the government through its media outlets led defamation campaigns against most opposition bloggers, particularly the secular Wael Abbas, and Muslim Brotherhood blogger Abdel Monem Mahmoud, who were accused by pro-government writers of treason and publication of false information. These harassments have led rights groups and even the U.S. State Department to issue reports and press releases in support of bloggers and condemning the government’s violation of press freedom by jailing bloggers (http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N15410941.htm). More jeopardizing to free speech, however, is the draft law under debate in the parliament about net regulation, providing for prison sentences for “abusive internet use” and for “publication of multimedia content without government permission.

Based on the above, blogging in the developing world can indeed act as a fifth estate, a watchdog, and a venue for agenda setting at a time of overall decline in press freedom in Egypt and the Arab world. Nevertheless, the growing impact of blogs should not be overestimated, since new media are continuously emerging, bringing with them newer forms of communications that inevitably steal some of the older media’s appeal. Facebook is one example.

References

Cooper, Stephen D. (2006). Watching the Watchdog: Bloggers as the Fifth

Estate. Spokane, WA: Marquette books, p355.

El Malky, R. (2007, February). Arab Media and Society. Blogging for Reform;

The Case of Egypt. Retrieved April 23, 2009, from http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=12

Isherwood, T. (2008, September). Arab Media and Society. A New Direction or

Moe of the Same? Political Blogging in Egypt. Retrieved April 23, 2009, from http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=693

Faris, D. (2008, September) . Arab Media and Society. Revolutions Without

Revolutionaries? Network Theory, Facebook, and The Egyptian Blogosphere. Retrieved April 22, 2009 from http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=694

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) (2009, April 6). Egypt: Internet: A Weapon

of Mass Revolution? Retrieved April 22, 2009, from http://www.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=30765

*Written April 2009

Arab Media Charters and Freedom of Expression

2009-10-27T16:19:00.000-07:00

Arab media charters introduced over the past few years have raised concerns over prospects for press freedom and censorship in the region. Many argued against the charters saying they consolidate Arab states' grip on information and threaten freedom of expression when criticism of governments is most needed to promote democratic reform. Others insisted on the need to regulate the media flow of information as a means of preserving cultural and religious norms. Media watchdog groups, however, were uniformly opposed to any laws restricting freedom of expression, and viewed them as no more than a censorial procedure by the inherently non-democratic Arab regimes aimed to silence any calls for reform.

The Arab Satellite Broadcasting Charter, adopted by Arab countries except Qatar and Lebanon, has perhaps been the target of most criticisms, especially articles penalizing criticism of public and political figures, the need for government license for broadcast activities, and the vague language concerning ideas such as "national security" and "interests of Arab states." Daoud Kuttab, a staunch critic of the charter, insisted that any attempt to insulate politicians and public figures from criticism must be viewed as censorial, "the strange notion that politicians are somehow immune from attack, that leaders are not to be insulted, or that the satellite broadcasters are obliged not to jeopardize Arab solidarity is nothing short of censorship," he maintained (Kuttab, 2008, para. 9). Kuttab further criticized the Arab Ministers of Information, who ratified the charter in their meeting February 2008, saying that in their position as the heads of state run media, they are themselves daily violating what they endorsed in the charter because of their disrespect to media ethics such as objectivity, honesty, and balance (para. 3).

The use of vague language was also subject to the attack of critics. Many viewed the phrase "supreme interests of the Arab States" as a code word for the maintenance of the political status quo, or in other words the protection of the current Arab regimes (Kuttab, 2008, para. 6). Lawrence Pintack described the above phrase as well others such as " social peace, national unity and public order" as "catch-all phrases" that were routinely used by Arab governments to crackdown on newspapers and jail journalists(Pintack 2008, para. 22). As Tim Crook points out, "what constitutes the public interest in not a matter of consistent agreement between judges, politicians, and journalists"(Chapman and Kinsey, eds., 2009). National security, for instance, according to Arab regimes, not only relates to military threats from foreign countries. As Hussein Amin points out, himself a lead author of the charter, national security in the Arab world encompasses "anything that can be considered a threat to the ruling institutions and their interests" including "negative statements about religious beliefs, Arab nationalism and its struggle, values, and national traditions." ( Amin, 2002, para.11) I would add: any sort of criticism or opposition to the ruling regime's policies or officials. This would therefore thwart press freedom particularly in the Arab world where "encouraging political reform" has been selected by the vast majority of journalists as the most significant role of Arab media at the moment(Pintack 2008, para. 37). Moreover, as Human Rights Watch (HRW) insightfully comments on the pending UAE media law, "[p]oliticians and other public figures relinquish part of their rights to reputation and privacy by accepting their positions and must therefore tolerate wider and more intense scrutiny of their conduct"(HRW 2009, para 23.)

The press in its power as the fourth estate would indeed suffer as a result of any attempt to impose content-based restrictions, license requirements, or punishments of offenders. Fear or being monitored or eventually punished inevitably pushes journalists into a state of self- censorship and anxiety. In Egypt a proposed media law calls for new prison penalties of between one month and three years and would make it possible for reporters to be prosecuted for “attacking social peace, national security, public order, and society’s values.” Article 32 of the UAE's pending media law fines up to 5 million dirham anyone who offends senior government officials or the royal family, an amount sufficient to instill fear and of course self-censorship.

Those who argue for regulation of media adopt views such as the necessity of "responsible" media performance, decency, religious and social standards. Some even went too far as to link the need for regulating broadcasting to the inherently illiterate, censorial, uneducated, and unsophisticated culture in the region. This view was particularly adopted by Hussein Amin who co-authored the charter despite his former opinions that would imply his opposition to such laws. "Arab culture is generally not as open as western society," Amin says in defense of the charter, describing Arab populations as "relatively uneducated and unsophisticated" (Amin 2008, para. 8) which necessitates a different set of criteria for censorship of broadcast media.

The above view, however, should not be a justification for censorship, since the high levels of illiteracy among Arab populations is largely due to failed government policies, and the situation will not be ameliorated by further surveillance of the media. On the contrary, a free press is as necessary a tool as formal education to raise the awareness of people to their rights and responsibilities. Instead of imposing a culture of fear through government-oriented channels, satellite television offers an avenue of free expression an fosters a culture of democracy that would hardly be enforced by the so-called national media.

This leads us to the difficult question: can press freedom and censorship coexist? The Universal Declaration on Human Rights holds that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." So far, there is no consensus on the definition of press freedom since opinions vary as to whether press freedom should signify a press completely free from restrictions on any information whatsoever, or freedom with responsibility as some others may argue. A third party would suggest that with the fast technological advancements in communications, the notion of censorship might become "obsolete" (Amin, 2002). I would agree to the second opinion provided the restrictions are clearly defined, as HRW (2009) maintains, specific, necessary, and "proportionate to the interest protected" (HRW 2009, para. 17).

References

Amin, H. (2002). Freedom As Value in Arab Media: Perceptions and Attitudes

Among Journalists. Political Communication, Apr-Jun2002, Vol. 19 Issue 2, p125-135.

Amin, H. (2008, March). Arab Media and Society. The Arab States Charter for

Satellite Television: A Quest for Regulation. Retrieved April 22, 2009, from http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=649

Chapman, J. and Kinsey M. eds. (2009). Broadcast Journalism: A Critical

Introduction. Freedoms and Responsibilities: Law for Broadcast Journalists. By Tim Crook. New York: Routledge. pp. 228-244

Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2009, April). Just The Good News Please: New UAE

Media Law Continues to Stifle Press. Retrieved April 22, 2009, from www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/06/just-good-news-please

Kuttab, D. (2008, March). Arab Media and Society. Satellite Censorship Arab

League Style. Retrieved April 22, 2009, from http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=651

Pintack, L. Harvard World Bank Workshop. (2008, May 16). The Role of the

Media As Watch-dogs, Agenda-setters, and Gate-keepers in Arab States. Retrieved April 22, 2009, from ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Conference/Conference%20papers/Pintak%20Ar ab%20Media.pdf

*Written April 2009

The Muslim Brotherhood and American Democracy: Could Obama Usher in New Hopes for Islamist Politics?

2009-07-01T05:01:00.000-07:00

My article in the Summer 2009 issue of Arches Quarterly, page 47